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Abstract: 
Technological analyses show that large potentials for energy conservation exist at 
the sectoral level. Moreover, a great part of these potentials seems economically 
attractive, but are not undertaken by industry. This paper provides a theoretical 
framework in which the energy conservation decision on the firm level plays a 
central role. It is argued that from an entrepreneurs point of view many theoreti-
cal barriers for energy conservation may exist, and that it is therefore rational 
(from their point of view) not to invest in seemingly profitable energy conserva-
tion technologies. Among the theoretical barriers are: high cost of information 
collection, budget problems, low expected profit due to low energy bill, uncer-
tainty about future energy prices, and being caught in a technological paradigm. 
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Energy conservation investments: a rational decision? 
1. Introduction 
Innovation in new technology is essential for firms to stay in business. Not 
adopting, the latest technology can mean that comparative advantages of com-
p'etitörs becöme large enough to run someone out of business. In practice, many 
firms that belóngi to a same sector (e.g. that have more or less the same products 
or production structure) have very different states (vintages) of technologies. The 
differences between sectors is probably even larger. The question is: why do 
some firms succeed in investing much in technological innovation where others 
fail to do so. Obviously, there can be many reasons for this, which can be divided 
into economie factors and non-economic reasons. Non-economie reasons must 
certainly not be regarded as irrational or irrelevant. For example, the fact that 
some new technological innovation is not part of the core business of the firm 
and therefore not implemented can be a very rational decision if all the costs 
entailed with getting the right information and implementation (transaction and 
adaption costs) outweighs the potential benefits (see section 10). 
This paper provides a theoretical framework on investment decisions by firms, in 
view of technological innovation in general and energy conservation in particular. 
Many studies have shown that energy efficiënt innovations that are economically 
attractive may not all implemented by firms (e.g. Blok et al. 1990, 1992, Melman 
1990). This behaviour seems, at first sight, somewhat irrational: why are profit-
able investments not undertaken? The aim of this paper is to provide a theoreti-
cal framework in which seemingly irrational behaviour is rationalized by intro-
ducing more realistic conditions. 
In the next paragraph the possibilities for evaluation of investment projects are 
given and it is derived that Net Present Value (NPV) method is a theoretically 
optimal investment criterion. After that, we first begin by providing a very simple 
investment decision framework by making some strong assumptions (e.g. profit 
maximization under perfect foresight, unlimited access to capital markets, certain 
cashflows). The optimal investment decision under these "textbook" conditions is 
derived in paragraph 3. Next, we relax most of the textbook assumptions in 
paragraph 4, and conclude in paragraph 5 that even with these highly stylized 
conditions there may be reasons not to invest in energy conservation technol-
ogies. Starting with paragraph 6 we use technological innovation motives 
(section 6 and 7) and market imperfections (section 8-10) to explain seemingly 
irrational investment behaviour of firms. We end this paper by listing the main 
conclusions trom each of the different parts of the literature survey. 
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2. Economie criteria 
There are many different ways of evaluating an investment project. Most of them 
involve evaluating cashflows that are generated by the project. Cashflows can, for 
example, be the investment costs or generated benefits from the investment. 
There are four economie criteria that are widely applied: Cóst-Benefit Ratio 
(CBR) analysis, Pay Back Period (PBP) analysis, Net Present Value (NPV) 
analysis, and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) analysis (see, for example, Brealey 
and Myers, 1991; Copeland and Weston, 1988; Bierman and Smidt, 1993). The 
first two methods do not explicitly take time preference into account, whereas the 
latter two methods do. All of these methods require knowledge on relevant costs 
and benefits of the investment. For the moment the assumption is made that all 
relevant cashflows are know to the manager with certainty. 
Cost-Benefit Ratio analysis calculates the ratio of all relevant costs compared to 
all relevant benefits. The investment is considered worth implementing if the 
CB-ratio is less than one, e.g. that all relevant costs are lower than all relevant 
benefits. This method does not take into account that 1 dollar now is worth 
more than one dollar in the future (the time-preference motive). 
Pay Back Period analysis calculates how long it takes before the initial invest-
ment has paid back itself. Assuming that the annual benefit (B) remains constant 
over time and that no other costs are incurred during the lifetime except for an 
initial investment (I0), the formula becomes: 
PBP = - , 
B 
For variable benefits and costs over time, the formula becomes a little more 
complicated, but the idea remains the same. An investment is considered to be 
profitable if the PBP of the project is smaller than the cut-off period. The cut-off 
period is defined as the longest period in which a technology is allowed to pay 
back its investment. All cashflows that are generated after the cut-off period are 
neglected. The cut-off period is often arbitrarily chosen because there exists no 
natural theoretical cut-off period. Therefore it remains an ad hoc decision rule. 
Net Present Value analysis examines all relevant cashflows during the lifetime of 
a project. Let CFt be the net cashflow generated in period z', where net cashflow 
equals relevant benefits minus relevant costs; and let I0 again be the initial 
investment required. Then, the Net Present Value is calculated as: 
^
 CFi 
i-i (l+r)' 
where T is the expected lifetime of the technology and r is a discount factor. The 
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discount factor is used to incórporate time preference. It can be interpreted as the 
reward on investment that investors demand for accepting delayed payment.1 An 
investment project is considered to be profitable if the NPV is greater than zero. 
Apparently, the NPV depends on the choice of r (other variables are fixed). A 
higher discount rate implies a lower NPV. In other words, at low discount rates 
an investment can be profitable, whereas at high discount rates the same project 
is not considered worth undertaking. 
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) method uses this dependence of NPV on r. 
The IRR is defined as the discount rate which makes the NPV = 0. If this IRR is 
higher than the manager's hurdle rate then the investment is considered to be 
profitable. The hurdle rate is defined as the minimum return on investment 
required by management (it is closely related to the discount rate r and to the 
concept of cut off point, see below). The hurdle rate is often arbitrarily chosen, 
but must in theory approximate the long term weighted average cost of capital. 
IRR can also be interpreted as the growth rate of an investment.2 
The Net Present Value method is theoretically superior to the other criteria for 
several reasons (see Brealey and Myers, 1991 chapter 5).3 The advantage of 
NPV over CBR-analysis is that CBR-analysis does not discount the cashflows 
and NPV analysis does (after all, a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in 
one year). The main disadvantage of PBP over NPV analysis is that PBP uses a 
cut-off point (which is often arbitrarily chosen); relevant cashflows that are 
generated after the cut-off period are neglected, whereas in NPV analysis all 
relevant cashflows are considered and discounted. The advantages of NPV over 
IRR are many. One of the major problems with IRR is that if there occurs more 
than one change in sign of the cashflow, the project may have several IRRs or 
no IRR at all (see Brealey and Myers, 1991 for some illustrative examples). 
It looks as if the PBP-analysis does not discount future cashflows, but in fact is 
does so implicitly. The fact that managers use a (short) cut-off period implies 
that they are interested in earning back their investment fast and do not care 
much about cashflows that are generated in the far future. Moreover, there is an 
equivalence between PBP-analysis and IRR-analysis when the simple case of 
equal cashflows over time is examined. It can be shown that, for fixed life time, 
N, the following holds: 
1
 The underlying assumption of this methods is that new available cashflows will be re-invested 
at a minimum rate of return which equals (or exceeds) the discount factor r. 
2
 The same assumption about the return on re-investments is made here (cf note 1), but since 
the discount rate is the variable to be determined, this assumption is often very unreaiistic. 
Examples of IRR's exceeding 25 % are no exception. 
3
 The following arguments are by no means conclusive, but rather intuitive. For an extensive 
overview, see Levyand Sarnat, 1988; Brealey and Myers, 1991. 
4 
PBP -~ w 
For example we take N = 10 years. Then it follows that a hurdle rate of 15% 
equals a PBP of 5 years. This result does not change the fact that PBP cut-off 
period is still an ad hoc rule. However, it shows that there is an implicit notion of 
discounting with those who use PBP-analysis. Nevertheless, given the advantages 
of NPV over the other mentioned economie criteria, we will henceforth only 
concentrate on this economie criterion. 
3. Rational investment decisions (the certainty case) 
In the section above the NPV condition for an investment to be profitable was 
given: if a single investment project has a positive NPV, it is worth undertaking. 
Now we will address the question which decision to make when more than one 
investment alternative is available. The answer is conditional upon the assump-
tions we make. Traditional economie decision theory assumes first and foremost 
that the firm is a profit or utility maximizing entity. Within this framework, the 
investment decision becomes one of maximizing (why this is printed in italics will 
become clear in section 7). The underlying assumptions of this classical theory 
are the following: 
Suppose that there are / investment alternatives in a investment set J. Let further 
be supposed that all relevant information about all alternatives i are known with 
certainty and that any project i and k'mJ are economically independent (e.g. not 
mutually exclusive). The relevant consequences of investing (the future possible 
states) are also known in advance. Further, assume that the firm can freely 
borrow money at the risk-free interest rate (e.g. no budgetary constraints), there 
are no taxes, no transaction costs and that the manager is also the owner of the 
firm.4 
In this situation> especially when the firm has no budget restriction, the optimal 
strategy for the firm would be to invest in all available projects i in J which have 
a positive NPV, since all these projects have a riskless, positive contribution to 
total profits. If some of the projects are, however, mutually exclusive, the project 
with the highest NPV should be chosen.5 
4
 In the latter case, the discount rate equals the risk-free interest rate in order to compensate 
the manager for accepting delayed cashflows (if the money is not invested in a project, it can 
always be invested risk free in govemmental bonds at the risk free interest rate). 
5
 See Bierman and Smidt, 1993 (chapter 5) 
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If the assumption of having no budget restriction is relaxed (e.g. limited borrow-
ing capacity and imperfect capital markets), the decision problem becomes an 
integer programming problem (IPP). The firm is no longer free to invest in every 
alternative, but is forced to make a decision. The maximization problem 
becomes: 
MAK Y,NPVi*Xi s-u EJ(*Xi s B 
iel ieJ 
Y =11> if project i is implemented 
*' \ 0 , else 
where NPVi is the NPV of project i, I; is the initial investment of project i and B 
is the total investment budget. If the budget is very large, it does not have to be 
a binding constraint, but if it is not large enough to cover all investment projects, 
some of them will not be implemented ("capital rationing"). This can be a first 
reason why firms do not invest in all profitable energy conservation projects. If a 
firm has a fixed budget and more projects with high NPVs (high opportunity 
costs) than the budget allows for, it is perfectly rational not to invest in a energy 
conservation technology even thought the expected return is higher than the 
hurdle rate. Firms which have a relatively low energy bill are, generally speaking, 
expected to have few possibilities to generate sufficiently large incremental 
cashüows (in the form of a reduced energy bill) to overcome the initial invest-
ment. Therefore, a small energy bill can be seen as a (rational) barrier to invest 
energy conservation technologies. 
When the decision of replacement is to be made, the manager is forced to 
compare the new technology with the old technology. If the new technology has 
a NPV which is greater than zero, it does not automatically imply that it should 
replace the old technology, because the old technology can still generate 
cashflows. To make a sound replacement decision, the incremental cashflow of 
the new technology should be analyzed. In the case of energy efficiënt technol-
ogies, it is important that the efficiency is expressed as the relative improvement 
of the new equipment over the old equipment. If the energy efficiency is small 
compared to the initial investment and the new equipment brings about higher 
operation and maintenance costs than the old equipment (due to the experience 
a firm has with the old technology), it can be perfectly rational not to invest in 
the new technology.6 
6
 Book value of the old equipment is not relevant for the replacement decision, because it is no 
cashflow (the expenses to buy the old machine have been made already). Therefore, depreciation 
motives are in this case (with no taxes) not relevant, see Bierman and Smidt, 1993 (chapter 7). For 
problems conceming the introduction of tax schemes and inflation, see Brealey and Myers, 1991 
(chapter 6) and Copeland and Weston, 1988 (chapter 3). 
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4. Rational investment decisions under uncertainty 
In real world situations, investment decisions under certainty do not exist. The 
reason why this situation was introduced in the previous sections was to show 
that under ideal circumstances the NPV method is theoretically the best method 
and the decision problem is one of maximization. In this section the certainty 
assumption is relaxed and two sorts of risks are discussed: firstly, the risk 
associated with undertaking a single investment (technology); secondly, the risk 
involved in adding a new technology to an already existing production process. 
However, it is still assumed that a firm can adequately assess the risks involved. 
4.1 Risk assessment for a single investment 
The aspect of risk introduces an extra dimension to the decision process. Not 
only the profitability of a project (expressed as expected NPV) is important, but 
also the risk attached to that specific project becomes a decision factor. The 
introduction of risk automatically brings about the need to make some assump-
tions about the attitude of a firm towards risk and return. The usual assumptions 
are: (i) if the returns of two projects are equal, firms prefer the project with the 
lowest risk attached; (ii) if the risks of two projects are equal, the project with 
the highest return is preferred. This attitude is called risk-averse. Note that this 
does not imply that all firms have the same degree of risk-aversion. Every firm has 
a subjective trade-off between return and risk. Very often higher returns are 
accompanied by higher risk. It is a matter of personal opinion how the trade-off 
is made. 
There are three ways to analyze the risk of a single specific investment project: 
(i) the state-preference method; (ii) valuation methods; (iii) sensitivity analysis. 
The first two methods are briefly discussed. The third method is beyond the 
scope of this framework (see Brealey and Myers, 1991 chapter 10 for an intro-
duction to this subject). 
State-preference models consider explicitly all alternative cashflow and states 
sequences. In these models, uncertain cashflows are adjusted for risk. Risk beco-
mes incorporated in the cashflow and therefore the dimension of the investment 
decision is reduced to one: Risk Adjusted Present Value (RAPV). There are 2 
ways of adjusting the uncertain cashflows: 1) by using a risk premium; 2) by 
estimating certainty equivalences of each possible cashflow and discounting 
against the risk-free discount rate (See figure l).7 
7
 See Bierman and Smidt, 1993 (chapters 17-19). 
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risk adjusted discount rate method 
- • discount for time and risk - 1 
present 
future value 
cashflow 
naircut ^ discount for time 
for risk value of money 
certainty-equivalence method 
_ f 
Figure 1. Two ways to incorporate risk into investment decision. 
Source: Brealey and Myers, pp 203 
Using a (uniform) risk premium is often done by firms, because of its relative 
ease. Once a risk premium is chosen, the selection and evaluation of investment 
alternatives is exactly the same as in the certainty case. Obviously, using a risk 
premium will always mean a higher (implicit) discount rate, which implies that 
the NPV's of alternatives are lower, and the chance of more non-profitable 
investment projects becomes higher. In fact, when a very large risk premium is 
used (e.g. the firm is very risk-averse), many possible technologies become 
unprofitable. In other words, using a unusually high discount rate can be a 
barrier for the adoption of new efficiënt technologies. 
Estimating certainty equivalences is theoretically more sound, because every 
cashflow is considered separately, and no uniform risk adjustment is made. But 
this is precisely why it is hard to use this method in practise. Estimating certainty 
equivalences requires probability assessment of all possible states, and on the 
scarcity of the currency considered (e.g. dollars, guilders) in those states. The 
scarcity aspect is strongly influenced by market development and the firm's 
financial position. Together, these elements constitute the risk-adjustment factors 
(RA.F.). To insure that the certainty equivalent of a certain currency unit is 
equal to unity, the expected value of the risk-adjustment factor over all states 
must be equal to unity: 
E(RA.F.) = £ R^-F-*P(state i) = 1. 
all staia i 
As a consequence, it must hold for any state / that R.A.F.* P(state /') < 1, which 
implies that the certainty equivalence is indeed always smaller that the certain 
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cashflow.8 Once the certainty equivalences have been assessed, the decision is 
unambiguous: if the project has a positive risk-adjusted net present value, it 
should be implemented. Again, the set of profitable altematives declines as the 
certainty equivalences become smaller (e.g. the firm is more risk-averse). 
The second way to analyze the risk of a single specific project is using valuation 
methods. Instead of considering all altematives explicitly, valuation methods try 
to use summary characteristics that are sufficiënt to describe a project's value. 
The changes in value of the cashflows are assumed to follow a particular 
probability distribution. If the necessary parameters of the probability distribu-
tion are known (or estimated), then the fluctuations can be predicted. For 
example, if cashflows are assumed to be normally distributed, then it is sufficiënt 
to know the expected cashflow and the Standard deviation of the cashflow. This 
information determines all possible states. This is also called probability assess-
ment. The method assumes that the decision maker is capable of making such a 
probability assessment. The result of the probability assessment is a probability 
distribution for the NPV of a project. The difference between probability 
assessment and certainty equivalence is that risk is explicitly accounted for as an 
extra dimension of the investment decision (see figure 2).9 
Probability investment B 
\ \ \ 
\ 
\ 
-5 -HO *25 
Investment A 
-Return, percent (r) 
+10 
• Return, percent (r) 
]!"igure 2. Investment decision with risk expressed as the explicit variation of the expected cashflow. 
Source: Brealey and Myers. 
8
 We implicitly assumed that there are more than two states with positive probability and 
positive risk-adjustment factors. 
9
 It is the adjusted NPV versus E(NPV) together with SD(NPV), where SD(.) stands for 
Standard deviation. 
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A unique decision rule in the two-dimensional case (return and risk) is hard to 
give because it depends on the degree of risk aversion. For example, an imagin-
ary energy conservation investment project has an expected cashflow of 100 
units, but the Standard deviation of the cashflows is 100 units. Although the 
expected cashflow is positive (in the case of certainty, this project would be 
implemented), there is more than 30% chance that the project will have a 
negative cashflow. It depends on the trade-off between return and risk whether 
this project is implemented. Firms that are highly risk averse (e.g. the chance of 
a negative cashflow is minimized), are slow in adoption energy conservation 
opportunities. A discussion on the risk-aversion topic can be found in Copeland 
and Weston, 1988 (chapters 4 and 5). A suggested decision rule can be the 
following: Implement project / if the expected NPV; is significantly greater than 
zero. This can be calculated by dividing the expected NPV by its Standard devia-
tion. If this result is greater than the value 2, the chance on an negative NPV is 
smaller than 2.5%. 
Firms can make different probability assessments of different future states, 
because they have different perceptions of macro-economie developments and 
their own, firm-specific developments within that economy. With these different 
assessments it can be perfectly rational not to invest in energy efficiënt technol-
ogies, even when engineers claim them to be profitable. For example, a firm's 
subjective expectation on the future energy prices can lead it to postpone or to 
reject the implementation of an efficiënt technology. High levels of uncertainty 
about future energy prices can therefore be an effective barrier to the implemen-
tation of energy efficiënt technologies. 
4.2 Risk assessment for "portfolio's" 
In the previous section the risk assessment of a single investment project was 
analyzed. But a new technology must be implemented in a production process or 
the investment is part of a portfolio. Then the interaction between the new 
technology and the already existing capital stock becomes important. Evaluation 
of additional risk to the firm as a whole as a consequence of implementing a 
new technology is the subject of this section.10 
Addition of new technology can basically have three effects: 1) total risk of the 
firm increases; 2) total risk of the firm decreases; 3) total risk of the firm 
remains the same. The last effect will not be discussed, because the first two 
effects are more interesting. 
10
 We shall treat this subject intuitively, rather than formally. For the formal discussion of this 
subject, see the portfolio theory of Sharpe. 
10 
The effect of addition of an investment to an already existing capital stock 
depends largely on the expected correlation between the capital stock and the 
new investment. If the expected correlation is positive, portfolio theory says that 
adding a new technology will increase return (provides that the investment 
project is profitable sec) but will also the total risk of the fïrm or portfolio. 
However, if the expected correlation is zero or negative, then adding a new 
investment could increase return, while decreasing risk at the same time (see 
figure 3). Sandstad et al (1992) say the following about this: "Even though a 
given investment may have extreme variability of returns -that is, large variance-
and thus be "risky" in a naive sense, it should not be considered risky if, in 
particular, it would tend to "pay off' in exactly those states in which the rest of 
the portfolio "lost" (Sandstad et al. 1992 talking about Lind 1982). 
-
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Figure 3. Two securities and different correlations 
Source: Bierman and Smidt, 1993 
In the case of energy efficiency improvement, an argument can be found for both 
a negative and a positive correlation. Energy efficiënt equipment can be seen as 
having a negative correlation with the already existing capital stock, because the 
relative performance of it increases as energy prices increase (profits to be 
obtained are bigger due to high energy prices), while the performance of the 
existing stock is negatively influenced by higher energy prices. The dependence 
on energy consumption becomes less due to energy efficiency improvement, and 
the risk attached to uncertain energy prices becomes smaller (the diversification 
argument). 
On the other hand, it can be argued that since the new equipment is added to 
the already existing capital stock, it will follow the same movements as the 
existing equipment, yielding a positive correlation. Moreover, if energy efficiency 
is seen as "core business activity", the correlation will tend to be positive. But 
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since it is seen as core business, it is usually assumed that the specific risks are 
smaller due to a better assessment of all possible states and the consequences 
from those states. When energy efficiency is seen as non-core business, the 
diversification argument holds, but the specific risk is estimated to be higher. 
The net effect of these opposite elements will determine, under these assump-
tions, if an energy conservation measure is implemented. 
5. Provisional conclusions 
At this point of the analyses we summarize the previous findings and present the 
paths we wish to pursue from here. First, we introduced a set of strict and 
unrealistic assumptions to derive that every investment with a positive NPV 
should be implemented. After introducing a budget constraint, the first reason 
for not investing in every profitable option was found: a budget that is too small 
for all profitable projects forces the firm to discard some profitable investments, 
among which energy conservation technologies. Secondly, uncertainty was intro-
duced, but with the assumption that a firm was capable of assessing all relevant 
risk factors and possible future states. It was concluded that firms could adjust 
the cashflows in many ways, such that the expected NPV of a project became 
negative. This is a second reason why not every profitable investment is imple-
mented (risk-aversion and uncertainty). 
Now, we wish to relax some of the assumptions of the classical economie frame-
work, such as the free and costless availability of information and the possibility 
of full probability assessment on future states. However, the relaxation has two 
mainstream paths of (techno)economic analysis (see Winter 1969) . The first is 
called "behavioral" theory, which emphasizes the firm-specific decision character-
istics. The most important names are Herbert Simon (1955,1959, 1978, 1979) and 
Dosi (1988, 1988a). The second stream is "managerialism", which treats informa-
tion asymmetry and agency problems. Important names are Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Williamson (1963). Another topic in managerialism is the "transaction 
cost" approach by Williamson. This subject has some interesting commonalities 
and differences with the theory of bounded rationality. The two mainstream 
paths will be treated consecutively; a view on transaction costs will conclude the 
analysis. See figure 4. 
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full information set and certainty 
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Figure 4. Schematic representation of the structure of the analysis. 
6. Bounded rationality 
Within the classical framework of profit or utility maximizing individuals, there 
nas already been some room to expiain seemingly irrational behaviour by 
introducing uncertainty and a budget constraint. But we need to go further. In 
this section the maximizing assumption will be relaxed and will be replaced by a 
satisficing assumption in an investment framework which is called "bounded 
rationality". Moreover, the perfect and costless information assumption is also 
relaxed. 
One of the main contributors to the theory of bounded rationality is Herbert 
Simon. The classical theory of maximizing costs and benefits and the assump-
tions of full probabiiity distributions is highly criticized. Simon presents some 
arguments why the maximizing framework should be replaced by a satisficing 
framework. He argues (Simon, 1955, 1979) that firms are unable to: 
(i) attach definite pay offs to each of the possible future outcomes 
(ii) specify the exact nature of the outcomes (so that there is no room for 
unanticipated consequences) 
(iii) make a complete ordering of pay offs 
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Moreover, he shows that the assumptions of "global rationality" in decision 
theory are sufficiënt, but certainly not necessary to derive well known economie 
phenomena. As an example, he shows that the economie phenomena of negative-
ly sloping demand curves can also be derived from bounded rationality (Simon 
1979, see also Becker 1962). In other words, he states that the unrealistic 
assumptions are not necessary, and that relaxing them would not hurt "estab-
lished economie theory". Moreover, it leaves some space for human decision 
behaviour. Empirical evidence on global rationality shows that only under the 
strong assumptions of classical decision theory an individual is maximizing its 
subjective expected utility (SEU); as soon as a more realistic environment is 
chosen, large deviations from maximizing SEU appear (Simon 1979). 
The main contribution of Simon is the introduction of two important concepts: 
1) satisficing principles; and 2) search strategies. He argues that these concepts 
are "a kind of rationality that is compatible with the access to information and 
the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including 
man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist (Simon, 1955)". 
The first major simplification he introduces is a different pay off (or profit) 
function, which can have two outcomes: satisfactory (1) or unsatisfactory (0). He 
proposes not to try to find the "best" opportunity, but a "good" opportunity.11 
Simon calls this the "satisficing principle". 
The second simplification concerns the information gathering process. This is 
related to the satisficing principle mentioned above. It involves information 
gathering only on outcomes of states for which a satisfactory pay off is expected 
(call it S'). Then, the search strategy becomes: look for an alternative that "maps" 
only on S'(for a more formal discussion, see Simon 1955).12 
In general, Simon's idea of bounded rationality means that he acknowledges the 
fact that a firm cannot (i) fully process all information on all the available 
alternatives; (ii) compute all possible future states as a consequence of imple-
menting alternatives; (iii) cannot find a set of weights for comparing the compo-
nents of a multiple pay-off. Therefore, his decision is essentially bounded and as 
a consequence, the firm must settle for a satisfactory pay-off or profit. In solving 
the investment decision problem, the firm must rely on simplified search and 
decision rules, look for sufficiënt solutions, define sub goals and divide the 
problem amongst specialists (Simon, 1979; see also Simon 1959, 1978). 
11
 As an example, he mentions that if a chess player finds an alternative that leads to a forced 
mate of the opponent, he generally adopts this alternative without worrying whether another 
alternative also leads to a forced mate. 
12
 By mapping, Simon means coarsely assessing the consequences on future outcomes of 
implementing an alternative. 
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From a computational point of view, bounded rationality means the difference 
between search for an optimal solution and a feasible solution. The feasibility 
restriction is simply adding a linear inequity. The restrictiveness of the feasibility 
constraint depends on two elements: the aspiration level and the set of "con-
sidered" alternatives. If the aspiration level is set very high, the feasibility restric-
tion will generally be very restrictive (e.g. a satisfactory solution will be close to 
a theoretical optimal solution). As the set of relevant alternatives becomes 
smaller, the feasibility inequity becomes more difficult to obtain. 
These new insights of decision theory and human behaviour can provide addi-
tional reasons why it may be "rational" for a firm not to invest in a seemingly 
profitable energy conservation option: 
(i) a firm is not capable of processing all relevant information about the exist-
ence of energy conservation (a maximum capacity of information storage): there 
is a knowledge or processing gap; 
(ii) a firm is not capable of assessing all (the right) consequences of an energy 
conservation investment (incomplete information and uncertainty); 
(iii) a firm has already reached a satisfactory pay off, so they have no incentive 
(relevance) to invest to reach for a better pay off; 
(iv) the selective search strategy of a firm ignores energy conservation invest-
ments. 
When a new energy-efficient technology is considered there may be lots of 
uncertainty. Engineers often have more knowledge on the expected advantages 
and risks of the new technology (see Blok et al 1992), but it remains a question 
how these results are interpreted by firms. Especially when managers are not 
familiar with the new technology, they tend to estimate the possible advantages 
lower, and the possible risk higher than the engineers. In other words, managers 
make different probability assessments of future cashflows than engineers, which 
helps explaining why managers tend to less profitable alternative energy conser-
vation technologies (see also the information asymmetry approach). 
Another consequence of non-maximizing behaviour, which was mentioned first 
by Leibenstein and later developed by many other researchers, is called X-
(in)efficiency. The term is used to indicate whether or not a firm's costs appear 
to be above the technological minimum levels.13 It is clear that when the costs 
are above the technological minimum, some inefficiencies appear. The nature of 
these inefficiencies was unclear to Leibenstein; hence, he named it X (Frantz, 
1992). Button and Weyman-Jones state that X-efficiency.."is a consequence of 
the nexus of pressure from the external environment on the individual decision 
maker and the responsibility consequences, or constraint concern, applying to the 
individual. The lower the intensity of environmental pressure on a decision 
13
 Or alternatively, X-inefficiency is the difference between maximal effectiveness of utilization 
and actual utilization. 
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maker, the less is his or her concern with the constraints operating on the 
organisation, and consequently, the lower is the effort expended" (Button and 
Weyman-Jones, 1992, pp 440). The proposition which follows from the above is 
that the looser the effort responsibility consequences, the greater the degree of 
X-inefficiency. When this proposition is applied to the case of energy conserva-
tion, a workable hypothesis can be posed: the absence of externai pressure of 
de cision makers can lead to less effort put in exploring energy conservation 
possibilities; hence, it can pose an effective banier for the adoption of energy 
efficiënt technologies. 
Moreover, some of the reasons mentioned above can also be explained by 
complementary theories that deal with the state of technology and other firm-
specific elements. These "technological innovation" theories will be discussed 
below. 
7. Technological trajectories 
Simon states that reaching a satisfactory level also depends on the previous pay 
offs, the experiences of the firm with alternatives, and the previous choice of 
alternatives. In other words, he argues that the firm-specific environment also 
determines the set of "considered" alternatives, the search strategy, and the 
aspiration level. However, a full formal derivation is not presented by him. 
Dosi et al (1988a) and Dosi (1988) present a technological innovation theory 
which also subscribes the idea of selective search. The main idea of this theory is 
that firms, or whole sectors for that matter, search for new opportunities within a 
given technological paradigm. Dosi defines a technological paradigm as a "pattern 
of solution of selected techno-economic problems, based on highly selective 
principals derived from the natural sciences, jointly with specific rules aimed to 
acquire new knowledge and safeguard it, whenever possible, against rapid 
diffusion to the competitors" (Dosi, 1988, pp 1127). 
A closely related element of the theory of technological paradigms is the idea of 
a knowledge base, which is defined as the set of inputs, knowledge and capabil-
ities that investors draw on when looking for innovative solutions. Different 
knowledge bases can imply different stages of the technological trajectory. 
Knowledge bases can be efficiently increased by internalizing R&D perform-
ances and other innovative search techniques. Among the advantages of internal-
izing R&D (in contrast to, for example, externai consultancy) are: 1) facilitating 
of information flows; and 2) limiting leaks of information (see Dosi, 1988, and 
the authors therein). 
Consequently, Dosi's hypothesis is that different firms or sectors have different 
technological paradigms, which account for the fact that some firms do, and 
other firms do not innovate or adopt certain technologies. The technological 
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paradigm, together with a set of heuristics, determine what the relevant prob-
lems are, and in which direction the solution should be sought. In other words, 
due to what is called "the paradigm-effect", research and adoption processes are 
driven in a certain direction and are blind to directions that do not fit within it 
(see figure 5). About the direction in which research and adaption will evolve 
Dosi says the following: "it has been suggested that major clusters of prevailing 
technological paradigms...involve the intensive utilization of some crucial input 
abundantly available at low cost" (Dosi, 1988). For example, in the oil-based 
synthetic chemistry the use of energy is very important. There one could expect a 
technological paradigm, focused on energy efficiency. Using this hypothesis, it is 
possible to explain why some flrms or sectors are ignorant about energy conser-
vation possibilities, namely that the relative role played by energy in the total 
costs is too small to be a priority of innovative research. 
\ 
Figure 5. Technological paradigm visualized. 
Source: Schot 1993 
A second concept of Dosi's theory is that technology knowledge is sometimes 
very tacit, in contrast to the idea that one can "dip freely into a general 'stock' or 
'pool' of technological knowledge" (Dosi, 1988). The latter idea is more or less 
implicitly made by many studies which assess the unexploited potential for 
energy conservation (such as Blok et al, 1990; Melman, 1990). Dosi, on the 
other hand clearly states that sufficiënt information on a certain technology does 
not imply that this technology can be implemented. Information is seen as a 
clear subset of technology.14 In innovative technology there are irreducible 
elements that cannot be sold or easily imitated, but depends mainly on the 
14
 As an analogy, Dosi says: "information stands vis-a-vis innovative technology as a subscription 
to the American Economie Review stands vis-a-vis winning the Nobel Prize in economics". 
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cumulative, augmented abiüties and skills, which are often highly tacit. This is 
quite similar to what Simon said about the pay offs of some investment. Techno-
logical innovation investment, therefore, depends very much on tacit knowledge, 
firm-specific features and existing (cumulated) activities. In relation to the 
knowledge base and R&D activities, one can argue that external consultancy 
does not have the ability to convert the tacit knowledge efficiently. Not having 
an internal energy coördinator (or energy manager) in the case of energy 
efficiency can mean a tacit knowledge barrier for adoption. 
Schot (1991, pp 104) argues that innovation and adaption on one side and the 
firm-specific environment on the other are highly affected by one another: "it is 
not a matter of technology adapting to its environment, but also adapting the 
environment to its technology". As a consequence, Schot predicts that technologi-
cal innovation is accompanied by adaptions of both technology and environment. 
But the adaptions a firm has to make can be large, and effort and trouble of the 
adaptions can outweigh the possible gains from the investment. This can be a 
possible barrier to the diffusion of energy efficiënt investments. As it has been 
said before: imitation can sometimes be even more expensive than the actual 
innovation itself. 
The situation characteristics that highly influence the innovation strategy of firms 
are, according to Dosi (1988; also see Schot 1991, Kemp et al. 1993): 
(i) Technological opportunities 
(ii) Appropriability conditions (such as patents, lead time, learning effects) 
(iii) Market inducement factors (such as relative prices shocks) 
If all these three components are favourable, innovation will be high. If some of 
them are unfavourable, innovation processes can be slowed down. These compo-
nents differ between, as well as within sectors, but they can be helpful in under-
standing why some firms do, and other firms do not innovate. 
Dosi provides a scheme of what he thinks is the actual innovation situation (in 
relation with the three situation characteristics), see table 1. From it, hypotheses 
concerning innovation and diffusion at sectoral levels can be derived. 
For example, in the science based sectors, the situation characteristics are very 
favourable. Thus, is these sectors, the innovation processes should be very ad-
vanced. On the other hand, on might argue (along with Dosi and Schot) that 
although innovation may be high, diffusion is not, because of high levels of 
tacitness and complex innovation stmctures. Then, the conditions for diffusion 
are not very favourable. Empirical testing should provide conclusions here. 
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category type of innova-
tion 
oppor-
tunities 
appro-
priate-
ness 
skill and know-
ledge 
size example 
s of sec-
tors 
supplier do-
minated 
process innova-
tion 
limited restric-
ted 
incremental 
improvement/ 
low R&D 
small textiles 
agricul-
ture 
specialized 
suppliers 
product in-
novation 
abun-
dant 
high tacit knowl-
edge/ low 
R&D 
small engi-
neering 
scale-
intensive 
product and 
process 
normal high high/high 
R&D 
big me tal, 
glass 
science based paradigm 
innovation 
very 
high 
high complex, 
tacit/high 
R&D 
big chemi-
cal 
industry 
Table 1: Ciassification of innovation opportunities 
On the subject of market inducement factors, one can argue that the absence of 
external pressure reduced the incentive to invest in energy efficiënt opportun-
ities. Conversely, strong external pressure (for example, what has happened in 
the chemical sector) can lead to faster adoption of energy efficiënt opportunities. 
At the end of this section, we would like to summarize briefly the findings from 
"behaviouralism" and its possible barriers: 
1) there is no relative important role within the paradigm for energy conserva-
tion 
2) there is little knowledge of the opportunities outside the paradigm 
3) there is a sufficiënt level of energy efficiency or energy conservation savings 
(satisficing principle) 
4) different (insufficiënt) knowledge bases 
5) high degree of tacit knowledge and low augmented skills for adop-
tion/imitation 
6) wrong set of opportunities, appropriability conditions and market inducement 
factors (absence of external pressure). 
8. Principal-agent problems 
A second mainstream of economie analysis is "manageriaüsm". Central in this 
analysis is the principal-agent relation, which exists because of the separation 
between ownership and management. A principal-agent relation exists "between 
two or more parties when one designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or 
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as a representative for the -other, designated as the principal in a particular 
domain of decision problems".15 The roots of this theory go back to Coase, who 
stated that the firm could not be seen as an identity, but as a collection of 
parties, each with their own interests (see Moerland, 1992). Separation between 
ownership (principal) and management (agent) has great influences on the firm's 
behaviour (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976).16 When the manager of the firm is 
the same as the owner (this is not necessarily the same as a one-man-firm) all 
decisions will point in the same direction. Behaviour of a firm where manager 
and owner are different people is often an outcome of the interplay of the 
motivations of the individuals comprising it, the rules and conventions governing 
their interaction, and the environment within which the firm operates (DeCanio, 
1993). Jensen and Meckling state: "the 'behaviour' of the firm is like the behav-
iour of the market; i.e. the outcome of a complex equilibrium process" (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). 
Although the hierarchy within the firm can be quite strong, it will probably not 
enough to unite all different motives and actions. Fama and Jensen (1983) distin-
guished four different levels of the decision making process: 
(i) initiating (generation and development of investment proposals); 
(ii) ratification (choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented); 
(iii) implementation (execution of ratified decisions); 
(iv) monitoring (measuring the performance of decision agents). 
(i) and (iii) together are called decision management, while (ii) and (iv) are 
called decision control. When different persons at different levels of the decision 
making process have different motivations or different objectives, the possibility 
exists that there can be substantial frictions between the levels of the decision 
making process, hence creating inefficiencies. In our case of energy conservation, 
an energy coördinator of a large firm can initiate many energy conservation 
projects, but when the general manager must make a selection, his choice or 
even personal favour can have a decisive weight on the project selection. It is not 
unrealistic to assume that general managers have less affiliation with energy 
efficiënt projects than energy coördinators. Therefore, a difference in staff 
function on the decision management and decision control level of decision 
making processes can perhaps help explain the difference in energy conservation 
investments by firms, and can even pose an effective banier. This hypothesis 
needs to be tested empirically. 
This definition was given by Ross in his article" The economie theory of agency: the principals 
problem". It was quoted by P.Moerland (1992). 
16
 In fact there are two forms of agency theory: the formal and the informal theory. The formal 
agency theory is normative and focuses upon the contractual relations between principals and 
agents for different states of information and risk. This part of the agency theory will not be 
discussed here. 
20 
Below we will discuss some reasons why managers tend to be biased in disfavour 
of energy conservation opportunities, and try to rationalize this behaviour from 
the managers point of view. After that, we shall discuss the consequences of 
asymmetrie information in the next section. 
A first possible consequence of this separation is "a shortsightedness of the 
management of the firnï', which can result in extremely high hurdle rates or 
short cut-off periods. Managers are often judged and compensated for short term 
results. Moreover, it often happens that managers are rotated through different 
jobs or do not intend to stay with the firm for the lifetime of the project. Then, 
quick cashflows are preferred to long term return. Energy conservation projects 
are often characterized by this long term cashflow. 
A second reason to under-invest in energy conservation opportunities is the low 
priority given to cost-cutting projects. Ross (1985) argues that "many energy 
conservation projects' lack of impact of production capacity, product quality and 
product flexibility is perceived as a reason for giving them a low priority. Cost-
cutting projects can be postponed, it is thought, without losing much of the 
opportunity, whereas market opportunities associated with new or improved 
products or increased production may be altogether fleeting". Empirical evidence 
(stated in Van der Doelen, 1988) shows that management is overestimating 
profits from market opportunities with 40%, while they are underestimating the 
returns from cost-cutting projects with 10%. Sassone and Martucci (1984) 
conclude on this: 'Thus, there is a bias in top managements' priorities: cost 
saving proposals are not as interesting as revenue enhancing proposals. And cost 
saving energy conservation proposals, addressing a relatively small cost category, 
perceived as risky and capital intensive, may be even less interesting". In addition 
to these arguments, Baumol (1962) showed that managers tend to maximize rate 
of growth of sales subject to a certain minimum profit constraint. Consequently, 
one can argue that managers therefore give priority to investments with a 
revenue enhancing character, which is the opposite of energy conservation 
projects. 
The problem is also closely related to the technological paradigm theory and the 
satisficing theory. Management resources are scarce and many opportunities for 
expanding or improving market share other than energy conservation are 
present. The direction in which innovation is "triggered" often does not involve 
energy conservation. 
A third problem that is mentioned in economie literature is that of disutility of 
effort on behalf of management. The disutility sterns from two sources: calculat-
ing NPV of projects and assessing all information on relatively small projects. 
Regarding the first disutility, Brealey and Myers say: "Pay back is the easiest way 
to communicate an idea of project profitability [...] Insisting that everyone com-
menting on a project do so in terms of NPV may cut off those who do not 
understand NPV, but who nevertheless can contribute useful information". 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) have suggested that the use of pay-back analysis can 
be contributed to the conflicting interests between managers and owners. 
Statman and Sepe (1984) have rejected this suggestion on empirieal evidence. In 
theory, therefore, the use of PBP-analysis instead of NPV-analysis should not be 
a banier for the adoption of energy conservation options. The second disutility, 
however, can mean a barder for the adoption of energy conservation technol-
ogies. Some energy conservation projects are relatively small (especially for big 
firrns), and assessing all information can be relatively costly (depending on the 
distance to core business). Given the time a manager has for making decisions, it 
can happen that relatively small fixed sums of capital are provided to lower 
hierarchical decision levels, which leaves top management with more time to 
carefully analyze the larger projects and the modes of financing them (the 
satisficing principle). This argument will hold for firms in a poor financial 
situation. Ross (1985) makes a distinction between "flexible budgeting firms" and 
"capital rationing firms". Flexible budgeting firms have decentralized capital 
budgeting processes, decisions are made locally and investments are evaluated at 
a uniform rate of return criterion. Capital rationing firms have critical approval 
decisions, based on competition among projects for an essential fixed sum. Ross 
concludes that financially poor firms are often characterized as "capital budget-
ing firms". 
A related problem here is the financing problem of small projects. If a firm is 
relatively poor and needs to get financial support from outside sources, it is very 
time consuming and costly to find the support, because outside financiers must 
be convinced that the project is worth undertaking. This is also related to the 
problem of information asymmetry between the firm and the outside finance 
source (see section 9). 
A last reason why managers under-invest in energy conservation may be a slight 
irrational one: Managers only invest in projects of which they have enough 
knowledge and in projects they enjoy or give them status. This behaviour is 
called "entrenchment" (see Schleifer and Vishuny, 1990). DeCanio (1993) states 
that "managers will be deterred from initiating risky projects if the personal 
consequences of failure seem to be much larger than the pay off to suecess [..] 
Human capital investment in energy conservation expertise will be low if the 
compensation and prestige of the managers responsible for energy use (e.g. 
facilities personnel) are less than the rewards for other positions (DeCanio, 1993, 
pp 908)". 
9. Information problem s 
A different perspective on investment decision theory and rationality is given by 
a second consequence of "managerialism". It involves the different states of 
information and the tacit character of knowledge (cf. the technological paradigm 
theory). Information problems can arise in the following situations: 1) the 
technician knows more than the manager about the performance of a energy 
conservation project: ex ante information asymmetry; 2) the manager knows more 
than the owners about the return of the project: ex post information asymmetry; 
3) the manager knows more than an external finance source; 
In the first case an information disadvantage is assumed for the manager. The 
technician claims a higher return than the manager can observe, due to the tacit 
knowledge of the technician. The technician is not able to adequately express the 
return and therefore the manager will adjust the stated return downwards or 
increase the hurdle rate. As a consequence of this information asymmetry, 
projects that are just above the critical return criterium will not be undertaken. 
In the second case an information disadvantage for the owner of the firm is 
assumed. In this case the manager is assumed to know the real profit of the 
investment project and the owner cannot observe this real profit. This is the 
most examined case of information asymmetry (see Antle and Eppen, 1985; 
Williamson 1988, 1974, 1963; Hirschleifer andThakor, 1992). In energy terms 
this is referred to as the landlord tenant problem (Sanstad et al. 1992). Antle and 
Eppen (1985) show that when the manager has an information advantage and 
the owners cannot observe the true profitability, an ex ante efficiënt firm will 
. have ex post inefficiencies. The explanation for this seemingly strange result 
sterns from the fact that the owners set the hurdle rate substantially above the 
cost of capital to ensure that only the projects with the highest profitability are 
implemented. The same consequence as in the first case can be witnessed. 
Nevertheless, it is still an optimal solution for the moral hazard problem (e.g. 
rational from the owners point of view). 
The third case of information asymmetry is the information advantage of the 
firm with respect to a external financing source. The moral hazard problem can 
be quite big here. The external source must be convinced that the investment 
project will actually yield enough to compensate him for the risk of bankruptcy. 
A bank (or another financial institution) can increase the cost of capital to such 
a level that it exceeds the return on investment. Leyland and Pyle (1977) show 
that information about the true profitability of an investment can be "signalled" 
by funding the investment with enough equity. The incentive to cheat will 
disappear, because the own interest is too big to cheat. But raising a sufficiënt 
amount of equity is often the problem. Therefore, firms that have budgetary 
problems (e.g. they cannot finance the investment by itself or prove reliable to 
the bank) are confronted with a higher cost of capital, reducing the number of 
profitable possibilities. 
In general we can conclude that when information asymmetries exist and cannot 
be resolved, the total set of profitable opportunities for energy conservation is 
reduced. Information asymmetry can therefore be seen as a barrier to the 
adoption of energy conservation opportunities. 
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10. Adaption costs 
As a complementary view, the adaption approach takes the adaption as its unit 
of analysis, instead of the individual (person or firm). The adaption cost 
approach suggests to take into account all costs to get from one state to another 
state. The focus, therefore, is on the asset specific characteristics, and not so 
much on the individual specifics. Williamson (as the main contributor to this 
theory, 1974) argues that if all relevant adaption costs are incurred, the eventual 
investment decision will be a rational one. This argument will be tautologie when 
it is used to explain under-investment when all other arguments stated above 
have failed. Then the statement becomes: since every argument for under-
investing in energy conservation has failed, the adaption costs must be too high 
for the possible return. It becomes an ex post explanation. 
It can also be an ex ante explanation, but flavoured by managers view on 
adaption costs. A reason very often mentioned for not investing is that the 
current equipment is satisfactory and that the extra costs incurred (finding 
trained personnel, replacement costs, opportunity costs) do not outweigh the 
potential benefits. Stated this way, the adaption cost motive can be very rational 
in the eyes of a manager. Additional adaption costs can depend heavily on 1) the 
specified of the project; 2) the knowledge base (or knowledge deficiency) of the 
firm. If the project is more specific (as is often the case in energy conservation 
(cf Zuidema and Farla, 1993) the adaption costs will raise. In other words, 
additional costs of replacement or investment (other than initial investment costs 
or operation and maintenance costs) are considered as adaption costs, and if 
they are high enough, they can be an effective barrier for energy conservation. 
11. Conclusions 
In this paper we have developed an investment decision framework for energy 
conservation opportunities. We presented a number of reasons to rationalize 
under-investment in energy conservation. The starting point of the analysis was 
"a perfect world", in which under-investment was irrational. After relaxing one 
assumption after another, new rationales for under-investment became apparent. 
In table 2 below, we summarize our results. One of the main conclusions we 
want to draw here is that most of the barriers result from a) an ex ante hurdle 
rate which is set to high (information asymmetry, agency costs); b) incomplete 
information and probability assessment (technological paradigm; bounded 
rationality, knowlegde gap). 
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Table 2. Main results 
Barrier for adoption of energy con-
servation opportunities 
Theoretical rationale 
low expected returns on investment low priority to cost-cutting projects 
high initial cost of information col-
lection 
low knowledge base; different tech-
nological paradigm 
high level of uncertainty due to fluc-
tuation in energy prices 
"normal" difference in perception of 
firms 
high level of uncertainty due to dis-
tance from core business1 
different technological paradigm; bo-
unded rationality 
too high hurdle rates information asymmetry; agency prob-
lems 
absence of problem recognition: EC 
options unknown2 
technological paradigm; 
absence of problem recognition: low 
energy costs 
potential return too small compared 
to initial investment 
liquidity constraints Many other high opportunities for 
allocating investment budget 
liquidity constraints Bad financial situation 
adverse impact on performance 
priorities 
lack of technological opportunities 
X-inefficiencies Absence of external pressure 
lack of openness to innovation Technological paradigm 
No new investments before old ones 
are fully depreciated 
Bad financial position, full competi-
tion 
too much work, too specific transactions costs are relatively too 
high 
1. Expressed as product quality, product tlexibility and product reliability 
2. Both physically and in terms of costs and benefits 
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